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The rise of the Pragmatic Web:  




Much attention has been paid to the rise of the “Semantic Web” – a set of protocols for 
meanings to be shared across different platforms and systems of encoding to allow our 
machines to “talk” to each other. Less attention has been paid to the development of what has 
been called the “Pragmatic Web”, which consists of networks of tools, protocols and agents 
(both human and algorithmic) that interact to make and interpret meanings through actions. 
In some ways, however, advances in creating a “Pragmatic Web” have outstripped efforts to 
create a “Semantic Web”, a fact seen most clearly in the various algorithms that monitor the 
actions of users and transform them into inferences about the kinds of content they wish to be 
fed or the kinds of products they want to buy – algorithms that are at the heart of search 
engines like Google, recommender systems like that used by Amazon.com, and filtering 
systems like Facebook’s EdgeRank. The rise of the Pragmatic Web introduces challenges to 
scholars of pragmatics and discourse analysis, forcing us to rethink fundamental principles of 
meaning and interaction, including how implicature is created, how inferences are formed, 
the role of context in assigning meaning to action, and what constitutes a “speech act” to 
begin with. This chapter explores the ways digital communication involving networks of 
human and non-human agents is changing how we study pragmatics, and the implications of 
this for how we understand the social and ethical aspects of computer mediated 
communication.  
 
Rodney H. Jones 
University of Reading 
212 Edith Morley Building 
Whiteknights Campus 




1. “This is your digital life”  
 
At the time I was writing this chapter, social media was going through a bit of a hard time. It 
had just been revealed that a firm called Cambridge Analytica had harvested the data of 
millions of Facebook users and their friends by convincing them to take a ‘personality test’ 
called “This is your digital life”. The quiz was like so many of those that circulate through 
social media, promising users to reveal to them what character they would be in Shakespeare 
or how they would die in Game of Thrones in exchange for granting access to their data. In 
the end, Facebook had to admit that the data of over 87 million users was used by Cambridge 
Analytica to support the political campaigns of right-wing American candidates, including 
Donald Trump, as well as to influence the British Brexit vote. The scandal ignited debates not 
just about online privacy and ethics, but about the fundamental business model of social 
media.  
In most of these debates, however, the key focus was “information” in a very 
conventional sense — what the media referred to as a “data breach”. And most people 
assumed that “the data” that had been “breached” consisted chiefly of the content of their 
profiles— information such where they lived, the university they had attended, their five 
favourite movies, and who their friends were. In truth, however, this “explicit” information 
was the least useful information for Cambridge Analytica. What they were really after was 
the implicit information, the record of seemingly trivial actions people took when interacting 
with their friends — what they were really after was the ‘likes’. By combining a person’s 
history of “likes” (or what were subsequently reframed as “reactions”) with their profile 
information and the kinds of people they interact with, Cambridge Analytica was able to infer 
a great deal about people without having to delve into things like personal messages, status 
updates, photos, or all of the other information Facebook holds (Cadwalladr and Graham-
Harrison 2018; Grassegger and Krogerus 2017). 
Obviously, the issue here was not just “information”, but also the kinds of meanings 
that could be inferred from the information collected. For this, Cambridge Analytica used a 
sophisticated algorithm which it developed based on the research of Michal Kosinski and his 
colleagues (Kosinski et al. 2013), who had come up with a model that was able to predict 
users’ personality traits based on the posts they had ‘liked’ on Facebook. They found that on 
the basis of only 68 ‘likes’ it was possible to predict, with a high degree of accuracy, a user’s 
skin colour, political affiliation, sexuality, religion, alcohol, cigarette and drug use, and even 
whether their parents were divorced. The predictive power of this algorithm was then 
combined with the communicative power of thousands of “bots”, which were able to react 
instantly to trending topics and produce targeted posts for particular “microcategories” of 
people.  
There are at least four things about this incident that are of interest to scholars of 
English language and discourse analysts. The first is the fact that the most valuable source of 
information for Cambridge Analytica came not so much from things that people said about 
themselves or others, but from things that they did, specifically the “speech act” of clicking 
the “like” button underneath a post in their Newsfeed. The second is that the important 
‘meaning’ of these “likes” was not the fact that someone liked something, but rather “deeper 
meanings” that could be inferred from these acts of liking. Of course, many of us have the 
experience of trying to infer what people mean when they “like” certain things on social 
media (see Maíz-Arévalo 2017). The difference here was that the inferences that were drawn 
by Cambridge Analytica’s powerful algorithm were not formed based on individual reactions, 
but on the trail of reactions users created over time, correlated with the reactions of 
thousands of other users. Finally, it is notable that the main thing these inferences were used 
to do was to generate “membership categories” (Antaki and Widdincombe 1998: Sacks 
1992), similar to the kinds of membership categories people use to make sense of others, 
predict their behaviour and tailor their communication to them. But again, these membership 
categories were different from the recognizable “social” categories that people use to 
negotiate their identities and make judgements about others. They were sophisticated 
aggregates of “measureable types” (Cheney-Lippold 2017), “microcategories” (like “straight 
male smoking vegetarian heavy metal fan who had grown up in a single parent family and 
made less than $50K a year”), identities that combined hundreds of data points to predict 
what sort of messages users would respond to.  
From the point of view of linguistics, then, the “meaning” of the information 
harvested by Cambridge Analytica was not so much a matter of the meanings of the words 
people wrote on their profiles or in their status updates, but of the meanings that could be 
inferred based on people’s actions, the informational contexts in which those actions were 
produced, and the kinds of identities that were associated with them. In other words, 
“meaning” here was not so much a matter of semantics as a matter of pragmatics. But what 
Cambridge Analytica’s algorithm was engaged in was no ordinary brand of pragmatics. It 
was, we might say, “pragmatics on steroids”.  
This chapter is about the relationship between meaning and action in digitally 
mediated communication in the first decades of the early twenty-first century, and how that 
relationship is increasingly governed by non-human participants in our interactions. It argues 
that understanding how people interact with technologies (and how technologies interact with 
people) requires that we look beyond notions of “data” and “information” to the pragmatic 
dimensions of digitally mediated communication. I am less interested in what Yus (2011) 
calls “cyberpragmatics”, the term he uses to refer to the ways “different applications for 
Internet communication (chatrooms, Messenger, e-mail, Web pages, etc.) affect the quality 
and quantity of contextual information accessed by users” and the “inferential strategies that 
people engage in while processing information exchanged with other people using digital 
technology”, and more interested in how meanings are made and inferred in the kinds of 
complex sociotechnical assemblages such as the one described above. These are 
environments in which communication is not just a matter of people talking to people 
“through” applications, but also of people talking to applications, and applications talking to 
one another, environments that don’t just involve multiple media, with different affordances 
for inferring context, or different platforms with different norms for how information is 
shared and interpreted, but environments which link together different platforms and media 
as information is shared and processed by algorithms which shape the kinds of information 
human actors are exposed to and the kinds of interactions they can have in real time. The 
question I wish to address then is to what extent the repertoire of concepts and tools 
developed in “analogue pragmatics” (the pragmatics of unmediated human-to-human 
communication) since the mid-twentieth century, or even the “cyberpragmatics” (the 
pragmatics of “computer-mediated communication”) of the twenty-first, are adequate for 
understanding the pragmatics of human-algorithm communication, what I have elsewhere 
referred to as “algorithmic pragmatics” (Jones 2016a).  
  
2. Historicizing the “Pragmatic Web” 
 
The history of the internet is in many ways a history of human engagement with different 
ways of understanding meaning — how meaning is created and what can be done with it. The 
earliest way of seeing the internet was in terms of syntax— a model in which information 
derives meaning from its relationship to other information. The “syntactic web” is basically a 
web of interrelated static information linked together with hyperlinks. The way information is 
connected to other information and the “grammar” of those connections is what makes it 
possible for us to navigate through it in a meaningful way. But the problem with this vision is 
that it offers a very narrow range of meaning making options and makes processes of 
information retrieval and interpretation sometimes cumbersome and time consuming. The 
syntactic web has improved significantly over the years, Google’s Page Rank algorithm, 
which exploits the hyperlinking structure of the web as a means of ranking some information 
as more important than other information, being a notable example. But the way we have 
come to experience Google (and, more importantly, the way Google experiences us) goes far 
beyond this initial syntactic vision of information.  
A more ambitious way of approaching the web, and the one that has dominated most 
discourse around software development in the last decade, is the vision of the “Semantic 
Web”, originally articulated by Tim Berners-Lee (Berners-Lee & Hendler 2001). The idea of 
the Semantic Web sees the internet as a networks of concepts, relations, and rules which can 
be used by different platforms and agents to “talk to” each other. As Berners-Lee  (2000; 
191) put it, “The first step is putting data on the Web in a form that machines can naturally 
understand, or converting it to that form. This creates … a Semantic Web – a web of data that 
can be processed directly or indirectly by machines”. 
Rather than just a collection of linked documents, the Semantic Web is potentially a 
collection of linked ontologies, that is, sets of different concepts about reality and relations 
between them. Initial advances toward the vision of a Semantic Web were made possible 
through the development of ‘metadata’ (Greenberg et al. 2003), machine-readable 
descriptions of data and documents which has allowed static information resources to be 
transformed into dynamic resources that interact with and respond to one other. This is what 
allows, for example, highly customised web content to be delivered to different users 
(Cardoso 2007). The development of machine learning technologies, data mining, advanced 
statistics, and predictive analytics has given a boost to this vision of a Semantic Web, making 
the extraction of meaning from unstructured and semi-structured data, text, images and 
videos much easier. As Cabeda (2017) puts it, “instead of rewriting the web so that the 
computers could understand, we are making the computers smarter and are slowly 
empowering them to aggregat(e) information …and learn what it means”.  
For many, however, the vision of a Semantic Web, even a super-powered version 
fueled by big data, has proven unsatisfactory, particularly when it comes to getting computers 
to interact with humans in ways in which meaning might be less ontological and more 
experiential. For them, the key problem with the notion of the Semantic Web lies in its 
underlying assumptions about meaning itself, specifically the assumption that meaning is a 
matter of “context free facts and logical rules” (Schoop et al. 2006: 75, see also McCool 
2005). It fails to take into account the way meaning is shaped by the way people and 
machines use information together in “the context of the informational moment” (Casgrande 
1999:4). “The human factor in the Semantic Web”, wrote Di Maio in 2008 “is still a largely 
unresolved issue, prompting central questions that … have been left behind in technical 
debates” (Di Maio 2008: 1). 
This dissatisfaction with the model of meaning offered by the Semantic Web has led 
to what Casanovas and his colleagues (Casanovas et al 2017) describe as a “pragmatic turn” 
in web development, an increased interest in how user behaviour and the contexts in which 
information is used can be represented in ways that machines can understand and respond to. 
What has come to be called the “Pragmatic Web” is a vision of the internet as a network of 
tools, protocols and agents (both human and algorithmic) that interact to make and interpret 
meaning through actions. Whereas meaning in the Semantic Web is a matter of relations 
between signs, meaning in the Pragmatic Web is created through relations between actions 
and the contexts within which those actions take place. 
For many computer scientists and digital strategists (see e.g. de Moor 2005; Leonard-
Hansen 2009), the “real” Pragmatic Web is a vision for the future—what Weigand and 
Paschke (2012: 190) call “Web 4.0”. But in many ways the web is already implicated in a 
wide range of pragmatic processes, a fact seen most clearly in the ways algorithms regularly 
monitor the actions of users (such as “likes”) and transform them into inferences about the 
kinds of content they wish to be fed or the kinds of products they wish to buy. At the time of 
writing, search engines like Google, for example, serve users results not just based on the 
syntactic technology of the original PageRank algorithm, but on inferences its algorithm 
forms about what users “want” based on thousands of previous actions of searching and 
clicking on particular results, as well as where that user is and what they might be doing 
when they search. Recommender systems like that used by Amazon.com similarly are 
becoming better and better at inferring what kinds of products people might  buy based on the 
“footprints” they leave as they transverse both digital and physical spaces. Finally, filtering 
systems like Facebook’s EdgeRank, which determines the order in which updates appear on 
users’ newsfeeds, are getting better at predicting what kinds of posts will trigger “reactions”, 
not just because Facebook the company wishes to do a better job at connecting people to the 
people they care about but because the more users react to posts, the better Facebook’s 
algorithms get at making future inferences about them. In all of these systems, meaning is 
created not just through the syntactic relationship between different bits of data, or the 
semantic relationship between different concepts represented through metadata, but through 
the ways algorithms have become adept at inferring meaning from the actions people perform 
and in enticing them to act in particular ways that make their intentions, desire and goals 
more legible to these algorithms.  
The Pragmatic Web, then, at least the way I am treating it in this chapter, is not so 
much a “thing” as it is a perspective on the way human-computer interaction has developed 
in the early twenty-first century. As Weigand and Paschke (2012: 183) put it:  
 
The Pragmatic Web is a perspective. It is not a web besides the WWW or Semantic 
Web. Considering the Internet as a platform of communication and coordination 
means that messages are not viewed in isolation but in the context of an interaction. 
Although messages can be interpreted to some extent in a context-free manner (the 
“literal” meaning), this does never exhaust their meaning. We also need to know (or 
design) its relationship with other messages, and actions, in the context of use.  
 
The question I would like to consider then, is not the degree to which the Pragmatic Web is 
achievable as a technological reality, but rather the degree to which the Pragmatic Web is 
achievable as an analytical perspective given our current understanding of pragmatics, or 
what I am calling “analogue pragmatics”, the set of tools developed to explain how humans 
create meaning and make inferences. We have already seen how the introduction of new 
technologies (such as the telephone) alter the way people create implicature and form 
inferences, requiring linguists to rethink the tools they use to understand these strategies 
(Hutchby 2001).What is different about the internet is that the medium does not just provide 
a new architecture within which humans exchange information, but that the medium itself has 
become a participant in the exchange of information, a participant which brings to 
interactions inferential processes that are very different than those used by humans. As 
Kitchin and Dodge (2011) argue, algorithms don’t just mediate but also function to constitute 
social interactions and associations. Hayles (2010: 96) similarly characterises the 
environment created by digital media as an environment “that senses the environment, creates 
a context for … information, communicates internally among components, draws inferences 
from the data, and comes to conclusions that, in scope if not complexity, far exceed what an 
unaided human could achieve”.  
Of course, when I speak of human-algorithm communication, I am not implying that 
algorithms are free-agents. They are created by humans and designed to advance the 
individual or institutional goals of their creators, whether those goals are to stoke the flames 
of political tribalism or to sell books. But, although the overall goals of algorithmic systems 
broadly reflect the intentions of their human programmers, the actual micro-mechanics of 
data-gathering, aggregation, inference and response are largely automated, and sometimes 
end up advancing broader goals in specific ways that programmers may not have anticipated. 
For example, YouTube’s recommender system favoured pro-Trump videos nearly 4 to 1 over 
pro-Clinton videos during the 2016 US elections, not because the creators of the algorithms 
favoured Trump, but because the algorithms were programmed to maximize engagement, and 
the algorithms figured out quite quickly that pro-Trump videos resulted in more responses 
(both negative and positive) from viewers (Lewis 2018). In another example, Microsoft’s 
machine-learning chatbot, Tay, had to be taken offline within 24 hours of its launch on 
Twitter after its conversation and language patterns became disturbingly racist, not because 
of the racist biases of its creators, but because that is how the algorithm learned to interact 
from human users of Twitter (Vincent 2016). In other words, what is programmed into 
algorithms is the directive to pursue a goal as efficiently as possible, and with newer systems, 
enhanced with machine learning capacities, to learn how to increase efficiency using the data 
that is made available to them. Rather than seeing algorithms, then, as simple, unitary 
interactants, it is better to view them them as socio-technical assemblages (Latour, 1990) that 
both embody the plans and goals of human creators and adapt to the behavior of the humans 
with which they interact.  
Problems of algorithmic biases versus the intentions of their creators, as well as 
problems of privacy and surveillance, as illustrated in the Cambridge Analytical scandal 
discussed above, are not so much problems about information as about the algorithmic 
processing of information and the way inferences about information are put to use; not so 
much problems of texts as problems of context; not so much problems of the Semantic Web 
as problems of the Pragmatic Web.  
 
3. Pragmatics: analogue and algorithmic  
 
Just as a pragmatic approach to digital communication involves looking at the web in a new 
way, as a web of actions and inferences, it also involves approaching pragmatics in a new 
way. Analogue pragmatics gives us a toolkit for understanding how people manipulate 
features of text and context to design interactions in ways that influence the direction and 
outcomes of communication. Algorithmic pragmatics, rather than focusing on closed systems 
of usually dyadic communication, sees pragmatic norms as operating within open complex 
systems in which information circulates and inferences are formed on multiple levels, in 
multiple contexts, based on multiple logics that both exploit and defy the forms of reasoning 
characteristic of human-to-human communication. Understanding it requires asking how 
algorithms form inferences based on people’s actions, how they create context and construct 
identities for people, and how they coerce behavioral change (Gorayska and Mey 2002). 
Whereas analogue pragmatics is about how people “do things with words”, algorithmic 
pragmatics is about how algorithms “do things” with people.  
I do not mean to imply that the insights of analogue pragmatics are obsolete when it 
comes to understanding the interaction between humans and algorithms. Humans are still 
humans, and the processes of meaning making and interpretation that they have developed 
with human interlocutors naturally affect their actions with and inferences about the workings 
of algorithms (Jones, forthcoming). In fact, many of the strategies internet companies use to 
entice people into making information about themselves available to algorithms by, for 
example, completing online quizzes or clicking on “Agree” in the dialogue boxes that pop up 
on their screens, are based on cleverly exploiting the principles and conventions of analogue 
pragmatics (such as the “Cooperative Principle” and expectations about the conditional 
relevance of sequential actions in communication; see Jones 2016b). Furthermore, the 
interfaces through which algorithms gather and respond to information are usually based on 
traditional assumptions about how human communication takes place (Galloway 2012), 
creating situations in which communication with an algorithm is made to resemble 
communication with a human, or in which certain types of human-to-human communication 
(such as “liking”) is encouraged because it provides data that is more “legible” to algorithms 
and more easily processed by them.   
Similarly, it might be argued that human pragmatic reasoning is also essentially 
“algorithmic”, that the whole idea of pragmatics is that people (and machines) produce and 
infer meanings by following processual logics, “recipes” for figuring out what is going on. 
The main difference between analogue and algorithmic pragmatics has to do with the 
underlying epistemological bases for these processual logics and the relative affordances for 
information processing of the human brain and the computer, two differences which I will 
elaborate on in the remainder of this chapter. 
Although pragmatics, as it has evolved over the past half a century, comes in many 
flavours, from more socially informed approaches (e.g. Culpepper 2011; Jaspers et al. 2010; 
Mey 2001) to more cognitive approaches (e.g. Beaver & Clark 2008; Bara 2010; Nuyts 
1991), what all scholars of pragmatics have in common is a concern with how people 
communicate and discern intentions below the level of explicit meaning. Much has been 
made of the “black box” nature of communicating with and through algorithms, what 
DeNicola (2012: 266) calls the “iceberg quality” of digital communication. For students of 
pragmatics, however, the “black box” nature of communication is nothing new, nor is it the 
sole provenance of technologically mediated communication. The central premise of 
pragmatics is that all communication is mediated through the “black box” of the human 
mind, and the only way communicators can discern the content of the minds of their 
interlocutors is through processes of inference formed through analyzing the relationship 
between “output” and the circumstances within which output is produced.  
The topics that have traditionally been of interest to students of pragmatics are 1) 
deixis, the ways language “indexes” people, objects or concepts in the external world; 2) 
conversational implicature, how it is possible for people to mean more (or less) than what 
they say; 3) pragmatic inference, how people figure out what people mean; 4) speech acts, 
how words can be used to perform various actions and the social conventions that make this 
possible; 5) discourse structure, how the sequence of utterances can affect what they mean; 6) 
participation, the different kinds of roles speakers and hearers can play in conversation and 
how those roles affect what they can say, do and understand; and 7) identity, how who we are 
or who we are taken to be  affects how we communicate and how people interpret what we 
say (Jones 2016c; Levinson 1983; Mey 2001). While all of these aspects of analogue 
pragmatics are somehow implicated in algorithmic pragmatics, I will limit my discussion 
here to four main areas where I see the need for students of pragmatics to refine their tools or 
redefine their concepts to cope with the new analytical challenges posed by digitally- 
mediated communication. These are: 1) speech acts, 2) inference and implicature, 3) context, 
and 4) identity.  
 
3.1 Speech acts  
 
According to Austin (1976: 76), whenever we communicate we are engaged in a “field of 
actions”, and we must distinguish what words “mean” from the way they operate within this 
field. Austin referred to this mode of operation as “force”, the effect words have on the 
situated experiences of interlocutors; in other words, what words “do”. In formulating an 
algorithmic pragmatics, then, the first question that must be asked is what is the difference 
between how people use language to do things and how algorithms do things?  
The most obvious difference between people and algorithms is in the arena of what 
Austin called performativity. In natural language, certain utterances have the ability to 
materially change the contexts in which they are uttered, but only if they meet certain 
conditions. “I now pronounce you husband and wife”, for instance, only results in two people 
being married if it is uttered by a particular kind of person at a particular time and in a 
particular place. The language of algorithms, on the other hand, is purely performative; a 
performativity that presupposes its own felicity. If code can be considered a language, 
Galloway says, it is a special kind of language: it is “the only language that is executable . . . 
the first language that actually does what it says” (Galloway 2004: 165-6; emphasis mine).  
How does this feature of code affect us when we interact with algorithms? The most 
important way is that is imposes a kind of “tyranny of performativity”. We cannot help but 
“act” whenever we interact through digital media, because algorithms automatically turn our 
utterances into actions — when we type a word on our keyboards, we set into motion a chain 
of operations within our own devices and other devices connected to ours over a network; 
when we react to or comment on a friend’s post, we set into motion a series of 
algorithmically orchestrated operations that can affect the order of information on other 
people’s newsfeeds as well as our own and may, when aggregated with other actions, 
eventually be interpreted as a “request” to receive certain political advertisements, news 
stories, or “memes”, even if that was not our intention. 
At the same time, just as algorithms automatically turn words into actions, they also 
automatically turn actions into “words” (or, rather, code), not only making those actions 
“legible” in particular ways to computers, but also preserving them for future reference. As 
Andrejevic (2009: 53) puts it, the internet is a “realm wherein every action, interaction, and 
transaction generates information about itself”. Clicks, steps, purchases, even the speed and 
rhythm with which one navigates websites or types on their keyboard (see e.g. Epp et al. 
2011) become information that is relentlessly recorded. Algorithmically extextualised actions 
are then turned back on users in feedback loops that are often designed to reinforce the same 
actions or re-engineer these actions in ways more amiable to the algorithm’s agenda.  
Algorithmically coerced actions are coerced based on what we have already done, and what 
the algorithm wants us to do next can change moment by moment based on our responses. 
Perhaps this is what Google’s Michael Schmidt meant when he said, half jokingly, that 
people don’t want Google to give them information; they want Google “to tell them what 
they should be doing next” (Jenkins 2010).  
The first step to formulating an algorithmic pragmatics, then, is to regard digital 
systems not as “information systems”, but as “action systems”, systems designed to act on 
our information and compel us to act in particular ways. Goldkuhl and Ågerfalk (2002: 85) 
argue that the key to understanding and designing computer systems is not “usability”, but 
“actability”, which they define as “an information system’s ability to perform actions, and to 
permit, promote and facilitate the performance of actions by users, both through the system 
and based on information from the system”. Of course, this view of information systems as 
action systems is, in some ways, not so different from Austin’s insistence that human 
communication takes place within a field of actions. The difference is the speed and 




3.2 Inferences and implicature 
 
The central focus of pragmatics is the “guesswork” involved in social interaction: how people 
interpret the intentions of others, and how people communicate meanings and perform 
actions without making their intentions explicit. Understanding language is more than just 
decoding words; it involves exquisitely sensitive processes of inferential reasoning. The only 
way the “guesswork” of communication works is because of a tacit agreement between 
speakers and hearers about the logical principles that should govern this “guesswork”. If 
nothing else, Grice (1989) argued, talking is a form of “rational behaviour”. The rational 
basis of human communication, however, is not just a matter of agreeing upon a set of 
principles or “maxims”; it is a matter of committing to a particular epistemology. The 
epistemological stance outlined by Grice and his followers (e.g. Horn 1984; Levinson 2000) 
is basically that knowledge is the result of deductive “if…then” reasoning: It is a “causal” 
epistemology in which hearers form hypothesis about meaning based on testing input against 
a mutually agreed upon “theory” of communication. 
Algorithms, on the other hand, while also engaging in guesswork, do so based on a 
very different epistemology: knowledge is a matter not of causation but of correlation. No 
underlying set of rules or “theory” of communication is necessary. Meaning is constructed 
mathematically, probabilistically, based on correlations between pieces of input. That is why 
Google can translate languages without actually “knowing” the rules of grammar or the 
meanings of words, simply by calculating the probability of a particular word in a particular 
context having a particular meaning based on billions of other occurrences of the use of that 
word in context. The probabilistic induction of algorithmic inferencing can tell retailers what 
book you might buy by correlating your past purchase with that of other readers, and political 
operatives can tell what candidate you might vote for based on your supermarket purchases 
or whether or not you shared posts related to Hello Kitty on Facebook (Cadwalladr and 
Graham-Harrison 2018), as well as how these behaviors might be altered with just the right 
algorithmically-informed nudge at the right time.  
There are risks related to all inferencing, whether algorithmic or analogue. One or 
both of the participants, for example, may be in possession of too little, too much, or the 
wrong kind of information with which to make inferences, or one of the participants may 
have access to resources for interpreting information not available to the other, making 
control of the personal information that is “given” and “given off” more difficult (Goffman 
1959).  When it comes to human-algorithm communication, these potential asymmetries are 
an inevitable feature of the interaction. The ability of algorithms to infer information from 
seemingly unrelated information makes it harder for people to control what can be known 
about them, and far exceeds humans’ ability to infer information about algorithms. 
Furthermore, algorithmic inferencing is much harder to challenge. A good example is the 
way police officers “profile” suspects. Sacks (1972) describes the analogue process by which 
police decide whether or not to stop and search a potential suspect, noting that the “propriety” 
of the inference is based on an agreed upon set of expectations about what sort of behaviour 
would rouse an “ordinary person” to suspicion, and it is only if the officer is able to convince 
a judge or jury that the inference has been properly arrived at that the person is convict-able. 
Nowadays, however, many police forces make use of what is known as “predictive policing”, 
which uses algorithms to, for example, deploy police officers to neighbourhoods where there 
is a higher probability of a crime being carried out. What arouses suspicion, then, is simply 
being present in the neighbourhood. This, of course, results in more crimes being discovered 
in these neighbourhoods, which can snowball into what Ensign and her colleagues (Ensign et 
al. 2017) call a “runaway feedback loop” that makes the algorithm’s prediction a self-
fulfilling prophesy. In such cases, contrary to the well-known warning of scientists, 





Although people and algorithms use very different kinds of epistemologies when making 
inferences, they both depend on the same sorts of information, including the content of the 
language that has been produced, the contexts in which this language may later appear, and 
the identities of the speakers and hearers. But what “context” and “identity” mean to 
algorithms is dramatically different from what they mean for humans. In one sense, 
algorithms’ understanding of “context” and “identity” is extremely reductive, limited to 
information that can be digitised and made legible to computers. On the other hand, their 
ability to laminate different contexts onto one another, to rapidly create new contexts within 
which to interpret information, and to construct very precise “identity types” based on very 
specific goals, allows them to use these kinds of information in ways that are not available to 
humans.   
Understanding context and how we use it to communicate in the analogue world is 
already a rich and contested topic (see for example Duranti and Goodwin 1992; van Dijk 
2008). Linguists and discourse analysts have debated whether context in communication 
should be approached as a micro-social phenomenon or a macro-social one, and how much 
context is fixed or emergent. One thing that most scholars concur on, however, is that human 
communication depends a great deal on the degree to which people are able to negotiate and, 
to some extent, agree upon the “definition” of the particular communicative situations in 
which they find themselves. Goffman (1972) argued that all situations have their own 
properties that follow from the fact of co-presence between two or more people, and that this 
co-presence and the “mutual monitoring possibilities” it affords makes it possible for people 
to negotiate “what’s going on here”. While pragmatic contexts naturally consist of individual 
contexts, communication requires that some common context be defined, often based on 
community norms and/or joint goals. In other words, there must be some alignment regarding 
what aspect of the situation “matters” when people create implicature and form inferences. 
More cognitively oriented linguists see this negotiation about what matters in terms of 
“relevance” (Sperber and Wilson 1986), arguing that communication is not so much a matter 
of shared social norms, but a matter of shared biologically determined cognitive imperatives 
to filter out potentially irrelevant information and to focus on information more likely to 
provide informational rewards.  
The rise of technologies like social media and mobile communication has 
problematized both social and cognitive understandings of context, making it more difficult 
for people both to negotiate shared understandings of context with others and to determine 
what information is more likely to be relevant in particular situations. This is because, as 
Weigand and Paschke (2012) point out, the Pragmatic Web is not a web of texts, but a web of 
contexts, which are exceedingly difficult to keep separate from one another. For humans, this 
has resulted in new challenges around juggling multiple contexts online and negotiating what 
they wish their interlocutors to take as relevant (boyd 2010; Tagg et al 2017).  
What is sometimes problematic for people is, for algorithms, rich with opportunities. 
For algorithms, the network of linked contexts that make up the internet is really a rich array 
of circumstances for forming inferences about our actions and utterances, and for seeing 
meaning in multiple text-context combinations simultaneously. Because algorithms have at 
their disposal informational horizons that exceed human perception, they are able to make 
relevant aspects of context about which people may not even be aware. While for humans, for 
example, the context of a web search might be a particular goal or activity, such as a school 
assignment, for Google, the context stretches back to all of the other searches this individual 
has performed, and may even include their email conversations about related topics.  
Much has been made of algorithms’ ability to design the contexts in which people 
consume and share information, such as one’s Facebook Newsfeed, an ability that was 
particularly evident in the  2016 US election and the UK Brexit vote, and much has also been 
made of the ability of algorithms to recontextualise information in ways that create new 
contexts that affect the ways we interpret texts and what we do with them, as when 
information from that web search suddenly becomes part of the context of another site in the 
form of a “clickbait” headline related to what was being searched for. Maybe what is most 
challenging about communicating with algorithms, though, is not that their tools for 
determining what is relevant in a given context or set of contexts is so different from ours, 
but that the “reasoning” behind these determinations are opaque to us.  
Humans still have some advantages over computers when it comes to 
contextualization in their ability to mutually monitor signals from interlocutors that are 
illegible to computers, and to adapt to subtle changes in the physical and social environment, 
framing and reframing their understanding and “design” of contexts as they go along (Tagg et 
al. 2017). As digital media increasingly weave themselves into the fabrics of human physical 
lives, however, embedded in watches, refrigerators, thermostats, and even clothing, not to 
mention the mobile phones that are carried everywhere, algorithms will become more adapt 
at sensing patterns in human behaviour: where we go, who we interact with, even what we 
say, and be able use this information to design more efficient contexts for interpreting our 
actions. 
 
3.4 Identities  
 
In interaction between humans, the social identities of interlocutors is an important ingredient 
for sense making. We use the social identities of interlocutors to interpret their words, and we 
use words to construct or alter aspects of our identities. In other words, like context, identity 
is both “fixed”, based on a certain set of “membership categories” available in our social 
worlds and relevant to whatever we  happen to be doing, and “emergent”, negotiated and co-
constructed with our interlocutors in  accordance with certain strategic goals (Bucholtz and 
Hall 2005, Jones 2016c, Sacks 1992). The “fixed” and “emergent” aspects of identity are not 
separate, but rather intertwined: we use membership categories strategically, appropriating 
and discarding them, making some more relevant in certain instances than others, and mixing 
them together to form hybrid identities.  
Similarly, when it comes to algorithms, much of the way they operate on us and affect 
our textual and interactional options is based on “who they think we are”. Much has been 
written about the “data doubles” (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) that algorithms cobble out of 
our incremental actions and utterances, and how these digital shadows follow us, both online  
and off, determining what sorts of discounts we are offered at shops and whether or not we  
are able to get loans from banks. In his book We are Data, Cheney-Lippold (2017) argues that 
algorithms make sense of us by turning us into “measurable types”. The worst thing about 
these “types”, he believes, is that they somehow obscure our “true selves”. “Who we are in 
the face of algorithmic interpretation”, he writes, “is who we are computationally calculated 
to be… and when our embodied individualities get ignored, we increasingly lose control not 
just over life but over how life itself is defined” (Cheney-Lippold 2017: 5). He suggests that 
“[w]hen data defines us, the complexities of our emotional and psychological lives online are 
flattened out for purposes of mass-scale, approximate data analysis” (Cheney-Lippold 2017: 
53).  
While this is no doubt true to some degree, the ways algorithms construct our 
identities and reflect them back to us is more complicated, and potentially more problematic. 
First of all, the processing of people into “recognizable types” that algorithms engage in is 
not entirely different from the way humans use “the recognizability of people as certain sorts 
of people or, more specifically, people as certain sorts of members of society” (Day n.d.: 1) 
as a resource for dealing with others. It is just that the categories available to algorithms are 
potentially more complex, and the ways they group different categories together (based on 
correlation rather than causation, see above), provides them with different kinds of resources 
for judging “who we are” and acting accordingly. What characterises algorithmically 
constructed identities is, first, their precision — we are not just men or gay or caucasian, but 
members of complex “micro-categories” consisting of bundles of inferences that algorithms 
have formed about us, and second, their flexibility; we are not the same from one moment to 
the next or from one site to the next. Algorithms adjust their assessments of us with every 
click or swipe, aggregating and processesing these quotidian actions in ways that can reveal 
not just our personality traits, but our momentary moods. The problem might not be, as 
Cheney-Lippold suggests, that algorithms ignore our emotional complexities, but just the 
opposite, that they get revealed and explained in ways that we ourselves are not even aware 
of. In other words, the problem with data doubles is not that they don’t reflect our “true 
selves”, but that they do, robbing us of the opportunity to engage in the kinds of self-
presentation and impression management that is central to social life.  
The most important thing to remember about algorithmic identity projects, though, is 
that, like all identity projects, they are “goal directed”. The identities that algorithms imagine 
for us are configured towards certain “category specific activities” (Sacks, 1992), in this case, 
usually shopping. In studies of Membership Categorization Analysis, Jayusi (1984) has 
highlighted the moral and normative character of categories and categorization. In the famous 
example by Sacks (1992), for instance, the fact that the categories of mother and baby are 
inferred by the action of the mother picking the baby up is predicated on the idea that mothers 
should pick up their babies when they cry. The normalising power of algorithms is even more 
efficient. Algorithms don’t just tell you “who they think you are” but also reward you for 
acting accordingly by offering you discounts, special offers, and other enticements, so that 
gradually you become the kind of person (or customer) you are expected to be. 
 
4. Conclusion: pragmatic competence in the age of the algorithm 
 
In pointing out some of the differences between the way humans do pragmatics, and the way 
algorithms do, I have not intended to demonise algorithms nor to suggest we have become 
slaves to them. We have not. In fact, as important as the ways algorithms have come to 
control us are the processes humans have been developing to figure out how to control 
algorithms and use them for their own purposes. Galloway (2006: 106) argues that video 
games are “allegories for our contemporary life under the protocological network of 
continuous informatic control”. As much as the code of the game produces the “perimeters 
for discursive possibility (and) possible actions…and subjective experiences” made available 
to players (Cheney-Lippold 2017: 218), good players are still able to master the game. “To 
play the game”, Galloway (2006: 91) writes, “means to play the code of the game. To win 
means to know the system. And thus to interpret a game means to interpret its algorithm”. 
Some have suggested that the way for us to get good at playing this game is to open 
up the “black box” (Pasquale 2015), that is, to force tech companies to tell us how their 
algorithms work, to lay bare their inferential processes. It is an approach that rests on 
assumptions that being able to see a system is the same as being able to know how it works 
and control it, a deep seated enlightenment notion that drives many of the attempts by 
governments to legislate the digital world. Insisting that companies like Facebook and 
Google tell us how their algorithms work, however, will probably have little effect, not just 
because big tech companies are not likely to part so easily with their intellectual property, but 
because even if algorithms were made transparent, their real workings would remain opaque 
to all but the most technologically savvy of us (Ananny and Crawford 2018). But most 
important, making algorithms transparent would compromise much of the efficiency and 
convenience we have come to expect from digital communication, just as asking people to 
make everything they mean explicit would render human communication not just incredibly 
inefficient but also frequently uncivil. 
Coping with the communicative challenges posed by the pragmatic web will require 
more than just trying to make algorithms more “accountable”, because they are just one 
component of the pragmatic web. As I said above, algorithms do not operate independent of 
their human interlocuters, nor do they exist independent of the institutional agendas, social 
practices, and relations of power through which they are created (Annany and Crawford 
2018; Crawford 2016).  The way to approach the pitfalls of the pragmatic web, therefore, is 
not just with political or technical solutions, but with a fuller engagement with pragmatics. 
Training in digital literacies must involve helping people to develop the new kinds of 
pragmatic competenceies that digital environments demand, helping them to become more 
sensitive to how algorithms process not just their “information” but also their actions, and 
helping them to reflect upon not just the inferential processes of algorithms, but also on the 
inferential processes they themselves develop as they interact with both human and non-
human actors within the Pragmatic Web.  
After the dust from the Cambridge Analytica scandal has settled, the kinds of 
algorithms implicated in it will continue their relentless processing of our information. What 
is perhaps good about the scandal is that it brought the issue of algorithms into the public 
conversation – it (aided by algorithms) elevated algorithmic pragmatics to the top of our 
Newsfeeds. And the more algorithms are included in our thinking about how our lives are 
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